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Revisiting Poverty Under Equal Protection in

the Wake of COVID-19
Alexis O'Connor
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Constitution recognizes that systemic discrimination targets some groups of
individuals more than others. 1 The Supreme Court of the United States classi-

fies those individuals as belonging to suspect or quasi-suspect classes depending
on the characteristics that render them particularly vulnerable. Some characteristics are unequivocally protected, such as race,2 nationality,' and immigrant
status. 4 However, the amount of protection provided for other characteristics,
such as genders and sexual orientation,6 continues to develop alongside society's conscience.7

The Court has applied certain factors to determine whether a group is
considered a suspect class for the purpose of equal protection. If a plaintiff
belongs to a suspect class and challenges government action based on their
class, then the Court applies greater scrutiny to determine the action's consti-

1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law"); see also Michael Gentithes, The Equal Protection Clause
and Immutability: The Characteristics of Suspect Classifications, 40 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 507,
511-12 (2010) ("Decisions on equal protection grounds are thus not really about whether the
law is purely equal but rather about the permissibility of the classifications it creates.").
2 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944) ("... [A]II legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect."); see also Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (subjecting an anti-miscegenation law to strict scrutiny because the
basis for the law's classification was race).
3 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215.
4 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) ("Aliens are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.") (internal citations omitted).
5 Craigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (finding a "gender-based differential" unconstitutional under equal protection).
6 Daniel J. Galvin, Jr., There's Nothing Rational About It: Heightened Scrutiny for Sexual
Orientation is Long Overdue, 25 William and Mary J. Race, Gender, and Social Justice 405,
424-31 (2019).
7 But see Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (finding old age does
not constitute a class provided heightened scrutiny under equal protection); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (finding that laws affecting people with
intellectual disabilities do not receive heightened scrutiny).
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tutionality.8 A group is more likely to be considered a suspect class if it has
been subjected to a long history of discrimination. 9 A group is also more likely
suspect if it is relatively powerless to protect itself through the usual political
process. 10 The Court also considers whether the members' shared characteristic
is immutable or highly visible." Taken in totality, these factors help determine
the level of scrutiny the Court applies when analyzing the constitutionality of
government action.

Although the vast majority of law professors teach their students that people in poverty do not constitute a suspect, or even quasi-suspect, class under

Equal Protection, the controlling case is actually much less definite. 1 2 In San
Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez, the parents of school children
challenged the district's property tax funding scheme because it disproportion-

ately resulted in children in low-income neighborhoods receiving less funding
for their education. 13 The Court recognized that the disparities in education
were "largely attributable" to the funding disparities that resulted from the
district's tax scheme. 14 However, the Court ultimately sided with the school
district and determined that its disparate funding was constitutionally sound
since the tax scheme implicated neither a suspect class nor a fundamental
right. 15
In its holding, the Court specified that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently
establish the existence of a suspect class. 16 The Court analyzed prior cases regarding the indigency of a party and found two necessary characteristics missing from the San Antonio case: (1) the indigency of the party rendered them
unable to afford a benefit; and (2) the absolute deprivation of the opportunity
to enjoy that benefit as a result.1 7 Rather than outright denying that indigency
can be characteristic of a suspect class, the Court actually indicates that the
8 Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34(2) Nova L. Rev. 407, 410-11 (2010).
9 San Antonio IndependentSchool District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also Rose,
supra note 8, at 417.
10 E.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
11

See Rose, supra note 8, at 420.

Rose, supra note 8.
13 411 U.S. at 4-5.
14 Id at 15-16.
12 See generally

15

Id

at 18.

16 Id. at 19 ("The case comes to us with no definitive description of the classifying facts or
delineation of the disfavored class.").
17

Id at 20-21.
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families in San Antonio merely failed to establish a suspect class in their particular case. 18
This past year, COVID-19 has revealed and exacerbated significant structural issues within the U.S. economy and its welfare systems. The people who
suffer the greatest consequence of these issues are not those promulgating
safety regulations or setting unemployment eligibility standards.19 Rather, the
people suffering are those already predisposed to the greatest financial and
health risks. 20 Instead of using San Antonio to deny the existence of a suspect
class, the Court could use its framework to establish such a class. The exacerbation of poverty during COVID-19 presents even more situations where a
party's indigency could result in the absolute deprivation of a benefit.
Considering the substantial wealth gap that currently exists between rich
and poor Americans, people living in poverty should constitute a class afforded
heightened scrutiny under equal protection.2 1 Unlike the American dream of
pulling oneself up by the bootstraps, the American reality depicts poverty as a

nearly unshakeable condition. Moreover, although an individual may find a
way out of poverty, there is always a class of people who live in poverty. The
characteristic may be immutable to the individual, but poverty continues to
exist as a significant social stigma.
It is reasonable for judges to treat people in poverty as members of a sus-

pect class where the law appears to target them because history proves that laws
have often been written to diminish their power and agency. Even in the
18 Id at 22 -23 ("... [I]n support of their charge that the system discriminates against the
"poor," appellees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed oof persons whose incomes are
beneath any designated poverty level."); see also id. at 23 ("... [N]either appellees nor the
District Court addressed the fact that, unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation of the desired benefit."); see also Rose, supra
note 8, at 416 -17.
19 Brian Root & Lena Simet, United States: Pandemic Impact on People in Poverty, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 2, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/02/united-

states-pandemic-impact-people-poverty

(illustrating how four percent of households with in-

come at or above $150,000 are behind on housing payments in comparison to forty-seven per-

cent of households with income less than $34,999).
20 Emma Mehrabi, Poverty in the US. Will Reach Drastic Levels Because of COVID-19, Children's Defense Fund (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.childrensdefense.org/blog/poverty-in-the-u-

s-will-reach-drastic-levels-because-of-covid-19/ (noting that children and people of color are already at the greatest risk of poverty).
21 E.g., Juliana Menasce, et al., Trends in Income and Wealth Inequality, Pew Research Center
(Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/01/09/trends-in-income-and-

wealth-inequality/.
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1960s, the Court expressed distaste for laws that distinguish on the basis of
wealth. 22 In a series of criminal cases, the Court has expressed even greater
concern for the equal protection rights of indigent criminal defendants whose
freedom may be directly implicated by their ability to afford a defense. 23 On
the civil side, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down
payment fees to vote in a state election as an infringement on indigent citizens'
right to vote. 2 4
Although government efforts including the CARES Act, the eviction moratorium, and stimulus checks have blunted the most severe effect of COVID19 on people living in poverty, each effort appears to be near its end.2 5 Provid-

ing stronger legal protections to those who are vulnerable to disparate treatment is particularly significant as the country sits upon the precipice of a post-

pandemic era. With the knowledge of how the system fails people living in
poverty, and the awareness of how these failures can crumble a society in crisis,
it would be irresponsible to not ensure greater legal protections for those most
effected. With the hope that legislators address inequalities perpetuated by law,
judges should ensure that those most affected by those inequalities receive the
most stringent protection.2 6

22 Harper v. Virginia Bd of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966); see Rose, supra note 8, at
412.
23 See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (allowing indigent criminal defendants to
receive free court transcripts); see Lane v. Brown 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (mandating free counsel
on criminal appeal for indigent defendants); see Burns v. Ohio 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (waiving
filing fees for habeas corpus applications and appeals for indigent defendants); see also Alan W.
Houseman, EqualProtectionand the Poor, 30 RUTGERs L. REv.

887, 891

(1976-77) (discussing

aforementioned cases).
24 Harper, 383 U.S. at 668; see Rose, supra note 8, at 412 (explaining that the Court also
considered the plaintiffs' right to vote to strike down the law).
25 Priyanka Boghani, How COVID Has Impacted Poverty in America, FRONTLINE (Dec. 8,
2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/covid-poverty-america/.
26

See Houseman, supra note 23, at 887-88 ("Equal justice requires much more [than equal

access to legal representation]: substantive laws that do not have a discriminatory effect on the
poor, a system of dispute resolution that assures at least minimum equality between the parties,
and an end to arbitrary governmental and private actions.").
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